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Abstract: Empirical evidences show that investors tend to be biased toward investing in 
domestic (home bias) and local (local bias) stocks. Familiarity is considered to be one of the 
reasons. A similar concept was proposed by Goldstein and Gigerenzer (1999, 2002), known as 
the recognition heuristic: “when choosing between two objects, of which only one is recognized, 
choose the recognized. Investors recognize or are familiar with local stocks, expect them to 
provide higher returns and, therefore, invest more in such stocks”. We conducted an experiment 
in Jena, Germany to test whether subjects show local bias and use recognition-based and 
familiarity-based portfolio strategies. We categorized them into an experienced and an 
inexperienced group; in addition, we used two data periods, i.e., bull market and bear market, to 
see if they behave differently in the two markets. Results show that all participants invested more 
of their endowments in the stock market in bull rather than bear market. All participants showed 
greater familiarity with local stocks. However, the experienced participants only invested more 
in local rather than recognized and familiar stocks; on the contrary, the inexperienced 
participants invested more in recognized and familiar but not local stocks. Our experiment shows 
no evidence that familiarity is a reason for local bias. 
Keywords: Recognition Heuristic, recognition-based portfolio strategy, familiarity-based 
portfolio strategy, local bias 
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1. Introduction 
“Familiarity breeds investments” (Huberman, 2001). Research evidences showed that 
investors tend to invest in familiar stocks while often ignoring the principles of portfolio theory. 
Familiarity is considered one of the main reasons for local bias (biased toward investing in local 
securities) (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, 2001). In this paper, we experimentally test whether 
participants invest more in familiar stocks (familiarity-based portfolio strategies) in different 
markets (bull and bear markets) and whether participants from different groups (experienced and 
inexperienced) behave differently. In contrast to the measurement of (perceived) familiarity, 
which is highly ambiguous, measuring recognition (binary choice) is easier and more precise. 
Therefore, we additionally test if participants invest more in recognized stocks (recognition-
based portfolio strategies). 
Empirical evidences revealed local bias on the part of both individual investors (laypeople) 
and investment managers (experts). Besides information asymmetry (investors knew more about 
the local companies, (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999)), evidences were more in favor of familiarity. 
Investors had the same information about local and nonlocal companies; however, they were 
more familiar with the local ones, therefore they invested more in such stocks. Huberman (2001) 
found that customers of a U.S. company (here, the Regional Bell Operating Company (RBOC)) 
tend to hold more of its shares and invest more money in it than in other RBOCs’ equity. His 
explanation was individual investors simply prefer to invest in familiar stocks. They “root for the 
home team” and feel more comfortable investing their money in a business that is tangible to 
them. Zhu (2002) investigated U.S. individual investors’ bias toward nearby companies and 
found that their familiarity with local companies and a ready reaction to local information are 
more plausible explanations. Feng and Seasholes (2004) studied the portfolio choices of 
individual investors in China. They found that stocks traded near where investors live receive the 
highest weights in their portfolios (local bias), and all tests supported the idea that familiarity 
drives purchases. Hiraki et al. (2003) investigated home bias in Japan in the sample period of 
1985-1998 and found that money managers’ investment behavior is consistent with the 
familiarity explanation.  
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Experimental evidences were also published in Ackert et al. (2005) and Weber et al. (2005). 
Ackert et al. (2005) tested home bias (investment bias toward domestic securities) (French and 
Poterba, 1991, Tesar and Werner, 1995) and local bias with students from the U.S. and Canada. 
Results demonstrated that all students showed greater familiarity with domestic compared to 
foreign stocks and with local compared to nonlocal stocks. They found that U.S. students 
invested significantly higher amounts in domestic investment opportunities when both the 
investments’ names and locations were given, whereas Canadian students showed familiarity 
bias at the local level. Weber et al. (2005) found that provision of asset names made participants 
feel more competent and changed their behavior. They also provided evidence that participants 
had a greater perceived familiarity with local and domestic securities and, in turn, invested more 
in such securities.  
The disadvantage of testing familiarity is that it is not easy for participants to precisely 
distinguish the level of familiarity. Recognition is distinct from familiarity in that it is binary and 
does not depend on the level of knowledge, which is thus irrelevant (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 
2002). 
Goldstein and Gigerenzer (1999, 2002) have proposed a theory of judgment as recognition 
heuristic for two-alternative tasks. “If one of two objects is recognized and the other is not, then 
infer that the recognized object has the higher value with respect to the criterion” (in our context, 
the criterion is the returns of stocks). For the financial market, Merton (1987) in his theoretical 
model, has already argued that security value is positively related to investors’ recognition. 
Furthermore, this was empirically testified by Lehavy and Sloan (2008). Consistent with these 
findings, Borges et al. (1999) and Ortmann et al. (2008)  found that constructing share portfolios 
based on simple name recognition alone often yields better returns than the market index. 
Therefore, according to the recognition heuristic, when choosing one of two stocks where one is 
recognized and the other is not, a decision maker should infer that recognized stock would  
brings higher returns. Investors should behave accordingly (Goldstein and Gigerenzer 1999, 
2002), i.e., when choosing between two objects, of which only one is recognized, choose the 
recognized object. However, the above literature focused on whether investors should use the 
recognition heuristic or not. There is no study about whether investors use the recognition 
heuristic to pick up stocks. This is one of our contributions in this paper because we test whether 
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participants use recognition-based and familiarity-based portfolio strategies. In addition, we 
investigate if local bias exists. 
Another contribution of this paper consists in testing our research questions in two 
different markets: bull and bear markets. Until now, research has shown that it is highly 
controversial under what market conditions the recognition heuristic should be used. Borges et al. 
(1999) showed that investors could obtain better-than-average returns simply by using the 
recognition heuristic. Boyd (2001) criticized that Borges et al.’s tests were only based on bull 
market. He demonstrated that the recognition heuristic performs poorly when the correlation 
between recognition and return is low (e.g., in bear markets), which means recognized stocks 
perform badly in bear market. Andersson and Rakow (2007) found no support for the claim that 
the recognition heuristic can be used as a simple strategy to choose stocks that yield better-than-
average returns. Most recently, Ortmann et al. (2008) retested recognition in both bull and bear 
markets and confirmed Borges et al.’s results. However, all these works are based on 
hypothetical assumptions about when we should use the name recognition strategy to choose 
stocks. There are no tests whether participants use the recognition heuristic to choose stocks 
under these two market conditions. This is, therefore, one of our research questions. Newell and 
Shanks (2004) tested investment decisions between two fictional companies for the use of name 
recognition. They found that participants use the recognition heuristic only when it has positive 
validity. The works of Oppenheimer (2003) and Pohl (2006) showed similar conclusions, i.e., 
that recognition was relied on when it had a high predictive validity; when it had a low predictive 
validity, it was ignored. However, if recognition has positive validity, e.g., when recognized and 
familiar stocks have higher returns, we do not know whether participants invest more in such 
stocks because of name recognition or because of return advantages. Thus, for the data we used, 
there is no correlation between familiarity and returns in both markets. We tested whether 
participants would use recognition-based and familiarity-based portfolio strategies even when 
there was no positive correlation between recognition and validity. 
 Borges et al. (1999) and Ortmann et al. (2008) also showed that laypeople recognized 
fewer stocks than experts; however, they did recognize the stocks that were recognized by most 
people. When constructing portfolios by selecting only prominent stocks, laypeople were able to 
obtain even higher returns than experts. This raises another question: would laypeople behave the 
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same way as experts in trusting the recognized and familiar stocks? Grinblatt and Keloharju 
(2001) and Giofré (2008)  showed that, compared to professional institution investors, household 
investors are more strongly influenced by location information, among others. Therefore, this is 
also one of our research questions, namely to test the difference between laypeople and experts.  
In our experiment, we categorized the participants into an experienced and an 
inexperienced group as an approximation to experts and laypeople, respectively. The 
experienced participants were students from economics departments, took finance and 
investment courses, had investment experience and read finance magazines and newspapers quite 
often; the other participants belonged to the inexperienced group. We did not expect that the 
experienced participants would behave the same way as professional institutional investors. We 
just tested whether the inexperienced participants were more strongly influenced by the local and 
recognition /familiarity information than the experienced participants. We provided participants 
with German domestic stocks, including local and nonlocal ones, to test whether they showed 
local bias. By asking participants ex post if they recognized the stocks and, if they answered yes, 
how familiar they were with them, we tested whether participants showed a tendency to invest 
more in recognized and familiar stocks. Since the recognition heuristic is about two-alternative 
tasks, we designed our experiment such that investors always faced pair-wise investment tasks. 
As mentioned before, we tested our questions in both bull and bear markets. 
In between-subject design experiments, knowledge of asset names influences portfolio 
behavior and shows home bias (Ackert et al., 2005, Weber et al., 2005). In our experiment, we 
tested the effect of name provision in a within-subject design. Participants were provided with 60 
stocks paired into 30 pairs with or without ID, including name, location (of companies’ 
headquarters), and sector. Unlike the other two experiments (Ackert et al., Weber et al.), we gave 
participants the possibility to keep the endowment as cash if they did not want to invest money in 
the stock market. We tested whether name provision would make participants feel more 
competent (Weber et al., 2005) so that they would invest more in the stock market and keep less 
cash. We expected that participants would trust the market more when stocks’ names were 
provided and invest more in the stock market (treatment effect). For the same reason, participants 
should invest more in the stock market in bull market (market effect); the experienced 
participants should also invest more in the stock market (group effect).  We also expected that 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 0106 
 
with the number of recognized stocks increasing (from 0 to 1 and 2), participants would increase 
their investment in the stock market. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experiment in detail. Section 3 
presents the results. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Research Method 
2.1 Overview 
    We ran the experiment in Max Planck Institute of Economics lab in Jena, Germany. The 
experiment consists of two parts: the portfolio decision task and the recognition task. 
The portfolio task is a repetitive individual decision making process. Participants are 
provided with 60 stocks from the German stock market (Deutsche Börse Group), of which 57 are 
Midcap market index (36 from MDAX Index, 21 from TecDAX Index) and another 3 local Jena 
stocks. We only choose stocks whose price data have been available since June 2004. Together 
with another 2 stocks in MidCap Index, there are 5 local Jena stocks in total. The information on 
60 stocks is shown in Appendix A. For each participant, 60 stocks are randomly paired into 30 
pairs, i.e., every participant is given different pairs. 
This is a two-treatment within-subject design experiment. In both treatments, participants 
are given data on the development of 30 months’ normalized prices and returns. Additionally, 
participants in the ‘with ID’ treatment are provided with name, location (of corporate 
headquarters), and sector of stocks, whereas in the ‘without ID’ treatment, only prices and 
returns information is provided. Each pair of stocks is randomly assigned to with or without ID 
treatment with probability 0.5.  
For each pair of stocks, there are two investment periods: bull and bear market. In both 
investment periods, prices are stocks’ monthly adjusted close prices and normalized with initial 
value equal to 10. Returns are calculated from prices with Rt = (Pt-Pt-1)/Pt-1. In bull market, prices 
date from June 2004 to November 2006 (30 months). In bear market, prices date from January 
2007 to June 2009 (30 months). We use the real monthly returns of December 2006 and July 
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2009 as the participants’ payment returns in bull and bear market, respectively.
1 Figure 1 shows 
the market prices of Midcap Stock Index which show that from June 2004 to December 2006 the 
market was increasing (bull market) and that from January 2007 to July 2009 it was decreasing 
(bear market). We remove the order effect by randomizing the order of these two investment 
periods, which means bull (bear) market has 0.5 probability to show up first. Participants do not 
know the real dates of these two investment periods; the information they are given is only the 
prices and returns from month 1 through month 30.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Prices for Midcap Stock Index from 1 June 2004 to 31 July 2009. Data from 1 June 2004 
to 31December 2006 are bull market; whereas data from 1 January 2007 to 31 July 2009 are bear 
market. Figures are from Deutsche Börse website (see note 1). 
 
Not surprisingly, the average returns in bull market are overall higher than in bear market, 
and the standard deviation in bull market are smaller than in bear market. Figure 2 plots the 60 
stocks’ average returns and standard deviation in two markets. We also see that the stocks are 
randomly scattered in figure 2, which means there are no systematic patterns between stocks. 
Therefore, participants should not use any systematic investment strategies only by observing the 
returns.         
 
                                                            
1 All data are from Xetra, Deutsche Börse Group (http://deutsche-
boerse.com/dbag/dispatch/en/kir/gdb_navigation/home)  and Yahoo! FINANCE ( http://de.finance.yahoo.com/ ) 
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Fig. 2. Average returns and standard deviation of 60 stocks in two markets 
 
2.2 Participants 
Participants, who numbered 192, on average aged 25 years (SD = 3.6), were recruited by 
using the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).  Table 1 provides detailed 
information about the participants. They were students of Friedrich Schiller University and 
University of Applied Sciences Jena and had on average completed 7.8 semesters (SD = 3.9).  
The students taking finance courses had on average completed 2.38 (SD = 1.84) courses. Of the 
85 nonlocal participants (from other places), 58 claimed they had stayed in Jena for more than 
one year. It follows that 165 participants were local residents. 
 
      Table 1   Information about participants 
   Yes  No          
Students 188  4       
Studying economics  35  157       
Taking finance courses  38
* 154       
Investment experience  57  135          
   Very Often  Often  Sometimes Rarely  Never 
Reading finance literature   2  4  21  45  119 
   Jena  Thuringia Others       
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   Yes  No          
Local  27  80  85       
* The number of students taking finance courses is higher than the number of 
students studying economics. The reason is that it is not necessary that only 
economics students take finance courses. Of 38 participants who claim they have 
taken at least one finance course, 13 claim they study other majors than economics.  
 
2.3 Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in German. Appendix C contains the English translation of 
the instructions. Since many foreign students took part in the experiment, we had to make sure 
they could speak German well enough to understand our instructions. For this reason, we ran a 
German language test before the experiment started. Only those who passed the test could take 
part in our experiment. After the instructions were distributed and before the experiment started, 
they were read aloud by an assistant of the experiment to make sure participants had understood 
the information clearly and correctly. The assistant did not know the purpose and hypotheses of 
the experiment, therefore emphasis on specific points was precluded when the instructions were 
read. 
Before the portfolio task, participants had to fill in a preexperiment questionnaire about age, 
gender, major, semesters completed, hometown, in which places they had stayed for more than 
one year, if they had taken finance courses before, if they had real investment experience, and if 
they read finance newspapers and magazines (selecting from a scale with 5 values: never, rarely, 
sometimes, often, very often).  
As mentioned above, during the portfolio task, each participant was provided with 30 pairs 
of stocks. For the same pair of stocks, there are two investment periods: bull and bear market. 
Therefore, there are 60 investment periods in total. The procedure for each investment period is 
as follows: 
1) At the beginning of each investment period, participants receive 1,200 experimental 
currency units (ECU), which they could invest in two stocks or keep as cash.   
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2) In each investment period, participants are given the normalized prices and returns 
information for both stocks, i.e., the data from June 2004 through November 2006 (January 
2007 through June 2009) if they are in bull (bear) market. They are given (not given) extra 
information about stocks’ names, location, and sector if they are in with (without) ID 
treatment. Two investment periods for the same pair of stocks belong to the same treatment. 
Figure 3 shows the information and investment screen in without ID treatment. In with ID 
treatment, stocks’ names, location, and sector are shown inside the boxes below “A” and 
“B.” 
3) Participants make their investment decisions by inputting 3 numbers in the text boxes on 
the screen, indicating how many ECU they invest in A (stock on the left), B (stock on the 
right) and keep as cash. The sum of these 3 numbers must be equal to 1,200. 
4) After participants have made their portfolio decisions, their realized returns and earnings 
are revealed on the next screen. The realized returns from stocks are real monthly returns 
of December 2006 (July 2009) if they are in bull (bear) market. Their payoffs are 
calculated by 
) 200 , 1 ( ) ( ) ( B A B B B A A A x x r x x r x x Payoff        ,  
 where rA and rB  are realized returns of 2 stocks, xA and xB are the amounts of money 
(ECU) invested in 2 stocks. (1,200-xA-xB) are the amounts of money kept as cash. 
After finishing the portfolio task, participants receive the instructions for the second part 
on the computer screen. They are presented with the names of 60 stocks they have at their 
disposal during the experiment and are asked to indicate whether they recognize the stocks or not 
by selecting a “Yes/No” binary choice. If they select “Yes,” they have to indicate how familiar 
they are with the stocks by selecting from a scale of 1 to 7, where 7 means very familiar and 1 
not very familiar.  
At the end of the experiment, one realized payoff out of 60 is chosen randomly to be paid 
out based on an exchange rate of 100 ECU =1euro. The program is written in z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007).   It took on average 23.9 minutes (SD = 6.3) for participants to finish the 
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portfolio task and 0.74 minutes (SD = 0.32) to finish the recognition task. Participants on average 
received 12.63 (SD=0.7) euros for taking part in the experiment.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Information and investment screen in without ID treatment 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Experienced and Inexperienced Participants 
We divided the participants into two groups: experienced and inexperienced. The 
participants in the experienced group satisfied at least one of the conditions below: 
1)  they study an economics-related major 
2)  they have taken finance, investment courses 
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3)  they have real investment experience 
4)  they read finance newspapers and magazines 
The participants in the inexperienced group satisfied none of the conditions. Of 192 
participants, 105 participants were in the experienced and 87 in the inexperienced group. 
3.2 Recognition Task 
First, we looked at how many stocks each participant recognized. On average, each 
participant recognized 13.8 (sd. =10) stocks. Figure 4 shows the histogram of the number of 
stocks recognized by the two groups. Twenty-two participants from the experienced group and 4 
participants from the inexperienced group claimed they recognized none of the 60 stocks. One 
participant from the experienced group claimed he recognized all 60 stocks. Most of the 
participants recognized between 0 and 30 stocks. The experienced participants on average 
recognized 17.59 (SD = 9.55) stocks, whereas the inexperienced participants on average 
recognized fewer stocks, i.e., 9.14 (SD = 8.37). 
 
 
Fig. 4. Histogram of number of stocks recognized by participants  
 
We then calculated participants’ familiarity with 60 stocks. If, during the recognition task, 
they chose “Yes,” they had to indicate their familiarity with the stocks by selecting from a scale 
of 1 to 7, where 7 meant recognize very well and 1 meant not very well. Figure 5 plots the 
familiarity with 60 stocks, which is calculated separately for the experienced and inexperienced 
participants. The figure indicates that, except one, all points are below the 45 degree line, which 
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means the experienced participants show greater familiarity than the inexperienced participants. 
Four out of 5 local stocks have a high familiarity score,
2 which means the participants are more 
familiar with local stocks. Detailed recognition data are given in Appendix B.  
 
 
Fig. 5.  Familiarity score of 60 stocks 
 
Further tests show that there is no correlation between familiarity and the realized returns 
of stocks for both bull and bear market (table 2). This means that using recognition- or 
familiarity-based portfolio strategies would not yield more payoffs. The results in figure 2 
indicate that there are no systematic patterns between the performances of 60 stocks. If 
participants invest more in recognized or familiar stocks, that is purely because of name 





2 The local stock that shows a very low familiarity score belongs to a comparatively small (market capital 13.19 
mill.) pharmacy and health care company. 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 01014 
 
   Table 2   Spearman correlation between familiarity and returns of 60 stocks 










Spearman  correlations -0.0942 0.0240 -0.1324 0.0226 
p-value    0.4739 0.8553 0.3133 0.8640 
S value    39380.98 35124.51  40754.61 35177.62 
H0: Correlation is equal to 0 
 
3.3 Investment in the Stock Market / Cash Amount Participants Keep  
In this subsection, we only focused on the cash participants kept and on how much 
participants invested in the stock market (equals to endowment minus cash). First, we tested 
treatment, market, and group effect. Second, we tested whether participants behaved differently 
when no ID information was provided compared to when the provided ID was not recognized. 
Finally, we tested whether participants increased their investment in the stock market according 
to the increase of the number of recognized stocks.  
Treatment, Group, and Market Effects 
Overall, there were 11,520 observations (192 participants, 60 decisions each) with 2 
treatments (with and without ID), 2 groups of participants (experienced and inexperienced 
group), and 2 markets (bull and bear market). In this subsection we tested whether name 
provision made participants feel more competent, whether participants therefore invested more in 
the stock market (treatment effect), whether the experienced participants invested more in stocks 
market than the inexperienced participants (group effect), and whether participants invested more 
in the stock market  in bull market than bear market (market effect).  
 










































Inexperienced group Experienced group
Bear market Bull market Bear market Bull market
Without ID With ID
 
Fig. 6. Average cash (ECU) participants keep, categorized by treatments, groups, and markets 
 
Figure 6 lists the average cash participants keep, categorized by treatment, group, and 
market. We used the Tobit regression model with treatments, groups, markets as the fixed effect 
since the cash participants kept was censored between 0 and 1,200, i.e., there were situations that 
participants invested all their endowments in the stock market, also situations that they kept all 
their endowments as cash. Furthermore, adding the subject random effect improved the model’s 
AIC from 104070.6 to 95774.7; a likelihood ratio test showed that adding 60 stocks dummies 
improved the model significantly (p=0.0000, chi2=230.98). The regression model we used is as 
follows: 
 
, where i =1,2,…,192 is the index of subjects; j =1,2,…, 60 is the index of decisions of each 
subject; t =1,2,…, 60 is the index of stocks. St  is the stock dummy variable, which equals to 1 if 
stock St is the available investment at decision j; T is the treatment dummy variable, which 
equals to 1 in with ID treatment; G is the group dummy variable, which equals to 1 for an 
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inexperienced participant; M is the market dummy variable, which equals to with 1 for bear 
market. For consistency, the variables we used here have the same meaning throughout the paper.  
Regression results are listed in table 3 (first column). The coefficients of treatment and the 
interactions with treatment are not significant. A further test about the sum of the coefficient of 
treatments and all the interactions with treatment are not significant either (chi2 (1) = 0.45, p = 
0.501).  Therefore, there is no treatment effect in our experiment. In other words, in a within-
subject design, the provision of stocks’ IDs does not make the participants invest more in the 
stock market.  
The coefficient of market is significant, and the interaction between market and group is 
significant. This means all participants kept more cash in bear than in bull market. Furthermore, 
in bear market the inexperienced participants kept more cash than the experienced participants. 
Thus, a market effect can be observed; however, a group effect can only be observed in bear 
market. 
            
                     Table 3   Tobit regression results of cash participants keep 
 (1)  (2) 
Intercept -43.29  -44.46 
 [83.01]  [96.19] 
Treatment (with ID=1)  18.379  14.08 
 [19.04]  [23.13] 
Market (Bear Market=1)  92.59*** 92.28*** 
 [19.03]  [18.72] 
Group (Inexp. Group=1)  41.16  49.7 
 [92.62]  [92.81] 
Treatment*Group 4.2  9.28 
 [28.06]  [31.87] 
Treatment*Market -24.06  -7.5 
 [26.47]  [31.37] 
Market*Group 72.6**  71.83** 
 [27.85]  [27.37] 
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 (1)  (2) 
Treatment*Group*Market -12.08  -18.83 
 [38.91]  [43.70] 
No. of observations  11520  9204 
No. of left-censored observations  4533  3523 
No. of uncensored observations  5855  4744 
No. of right-censored observations  1132  937 
Rho 0.654  0.663 
Note: The coefficients of 60 stocks dummies are not included in 
the table. Column 1 lists the regression results of all observations. 
Column 2 lists the regression results of observations in without ID 
treatment and observations that both stocks are not recognized in 
with ID treatment. *** p<0.00, ** p<0.01. Standard errors in 
brackets 
  
In summary, the provision of stocks’ IDs does not make participants invest more in the 
stock market. All participants are sensitive to bull and bear market. They are more conservative 
when the market is going down. In bear market, the inexperienced participants are even more 
conservative than the experienced participants.  
Stocks’ IDs not Provided and Stocks’ Names Unrecognized  
Weber et al. (2005)  and Ackert et al. (2005) argued that name provision made participants 
feel more competent. Therefore, the latter invested more in stocks whose names were provided 
(compared to the when no names were provided). However, this also raises the question if 
participants will trust the market when the provided names are not recognized or familiar to them. 
In this subsection, we examined if participants invested more in the stock market when provided 
names were not recognized, compared to when no names were provided. We used the 
observations in without ID treatment and in with ID treatment, but neither of the two stocks were 
recognized. Figure 7 shows the average cash participants kept under these two scenarios.  
 










































Inexperienced group Experienced group
Bear market Bull market Bear market Bull market
Name unavailable Name unrecognized
 
Fig. 7. Comparison of average cash (ECU) participants keep when names are not provided 
(unavailable) and names are not recognized (unrecognized), categorized by markets and groups 
of participants   
 
We used the subject random effect model with 60 stocks dummies. Analysis showed that 
adding the subject random effect improved the model’s AIC from 84130.67 to 77426.96. 
Furthermore, a likelihood ratio test showed that adding 60 stocks dummies to the random Tobit 
model improved the model significantly (p =.0004, chi2=203.79). Results are listed in table 3 
(second column). We obtained similar results in the part entitled Treatment, Group, and Market 
Effects. The coefficients of market and the interaction between market and group are significant, 
which means participants kept more cash in bear than in bull market; in bear market, the 
inexperienced participants kept even more cash than the experienced participants. The 
coefficients of treatment and the interactions with treatments are not significant. A further test 
about the sum of the coefficients of treatment and all the interactions with treatment is not 
significant either (chi2(1) = 0.02, p = 0.891). Therefore, when both names are not recognized, 
name provision does not make participants invest more in the stock market. 
Recognition-Based Portfolio Strategy 
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In this subsection, we categorized the observations in with ID treatment into three groups: 
neither of the two stocks is recognized, only one is recognized, both are recognized. We tested 
whether participants increased investment in stock market according to the increase of the 
number of recognized stocks.   
Figure 8 shows the average cash (ECU) participants kept in with ID treatment, categorized 
by the number of recognized stocks, group, and market. The figure shows that the average cash 
kept by the experienced participants decreased with an increase of the number of stocks they 
recognized. Nevertheless, the inexperienced participants kept least cash when only one stock was 
recognized, and kept most cash when no stocks were recognized. We still assume that the cash 
kept by the inexperienced participants decreased with the number of recognized stocks. However, 
since the two groups showed different patterns, we also tested them separately. Our hypothesis is 

















































Inexperienced group Experienced group
Bear market Bull market Bear market Bull market
Both unrecognized Only one recognized
Both recognized
 
Fig. 8. Average cash participants keep (ECU) in with ID treatment, categorized by number of 
recognized stocks, market, and group  
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To test the hypothesis, we used the subject random effect Tobit model
 with 60 stocks 
dummies. By adding the random effect improved the model’s AIC from 53044.82 to 49197.78, 
and a likelihood ratio test showed that adding 60 stocks dummies improved the regression 
significantly (p=0.000, chi2=150.21).  The model we used is as follows: 
 
, where REC is the recognition situation of subject i in decision j, REC=0 if no stocks are 
recognized, REC=1 if only one stock is recognized, and REC=2 if both stocks are recognized.  
Results are shown in table 4 (first column). The coefficient of REC is 5.68 and is not 
significant (p=0.721); separate tests with the experienced and inexperienced participants do not 
change the results (table 4, second and third columns). Our hypothesis that the amount of cash 
kept changes according to the number of recognized stocks does not hold. However, here we 
only tested the within-subject effect. The decrease in cash according to the number of stocks is 
evident in figure 8. Therefore, we subsequently tested if the cash change was due to the between-
subject effect, i.e., the subjects who recognized more stocks invested more in the stock market 
and kept less cash. In order to measure subjects’ recognition level, we separated REC into two 
parts, REC = RI + RDev, where   is individual i’s average recognition score 
( ). The more stocks subjects recognized, the higher was the RI. RDev is the deviation 
of each observation from the individual average. Yet the subject random effect improved the 
model’s AIC from 52980.03 to 49193.77, and adding 60 stocks dummies improved the model 
significantly (p=0.000, chi2=150.87). Therefore, the model changes to: 
 
 
       Table 4   Determinant cash in with ID treatment 
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Intercept 22.26  -227.75  152.63  460.49**
 [108.70]  [141.39]  [158.19]  [134.81] 
Market (Bear Market=1)  69.56*** 67.46***  135.09***  69.55***
 [18.52]  [17.06]  [21.84]  [18.52] 
Group (Inexp. Group=1)  36.92      -77.02 
 [92.12]      [100.52] 
Market*Group 60.09*      60.11* 
 [27.39]      [27.39] 
REC 5.68  27.07  -25.39   
 [15.89]  [18.58]  [29.43]   
RI       -381.58* 
       [149.59] 
Rdev       10 
       [15.95] 
No. of observations  5892  3254  2638  5892 
No. of left-censored 
observations 2345  1290  1055  2345 
No. of uncensored 
observations 2983  1654  1329  2983 
No. of right-censored 
observations 564  310  254  564 
rho 0.65  0.68  0.61  0.64 
Note: The coefficients of 60 stocks dummies are not included in the table. Columns 
1-3 list the regression results of within-subject effect. Column 1 is the regression for 
all subjects. Column 2 lists the regression for the experienced participants only. 
Column 3 lists the regression for the inexperienced participants only. Column 4 lists 
the regression results of the between-subject effect. *** p<0.00, ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05. Standard errors in brackets 
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Results are shown in table 4 (column 4). We observe that the coefficient of RI is negative 
and significant when p<0.05. This confirms our hypothesis that participants who recognize more 
stocks (with higher RI) keep less cash. In summary, participants do not invest more in the stock 
market when provided with more recognized stocks (within subjects). However, those 
participants who recognize more stocks invest more (between subjects) in the stock market. 
3.4 Recognition-Based, Familiarity-Based Portfolio Strategies, Local Bias 
In this subsection, we analyzed the investments in stocks to see if participants invested 
more in recognized stocks, familiar stocks, or local stocks. We tested the recognition-based and 
familiarity-based portfolio strategy separately. First, we tested the recognition-based portfolio 
strategy together with local bias. Then, we replaced the recognition-based strategy with the 
familiarity-based strategy. 
In figure 9, we listed the average investments in with ID treatment, categorized by market, 
local stock, and recognition. Results in figure 9a refer to the experienced group, those in figure 
















































Bear market Bull market
nonlocal local nonlocal local
a. Experienced Group
Unrecognized stock Recognized stock
 


















































Bear market Bull market
nonlocal local nonlocal local
b. Inexperienced Group
Unrecognized stock Recognized stock
 
Fig. 9. Average investments (ECU) in stocks in with ID treatment, categorized by market, local 
stock, and recognition 
 
Figure 9 shows different patterns for the participants from the two groups. The experienced 
group invested more in local stocks, whereas the inexperienced group invested more in 
recognized stocks. Therefore, we used the random effect Tobit model (participants’ portfolios 
were censored between 0 and 1,200 ECU) and tested the two groups separately. It is reasonable 
to assume that if participants recognize only one stock of the pair, the unrecognized stock might 
also have a positive impact on the recognized one in the same pair, e.g., the unrecognized stock 
makes participants invest more in the recognized stock. The same assumption goes for the local 
and nonlocal stock. Therefore, we included not only the recognition dummy and the local 
dummy of one stock in the model, but also the recognition dummy and the local dummy of the 
other stock in the same pair. The model we used is as follows: 
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, where R is the dummy variable for recognition and RP is the dummy variable for the 
recognition of the other stock in the same pair; 1 if stock is recognized, 0 if it is not recognized. 
Local is the dummy variable for local stock, LocalP is the local dummy for the other stock in the 
same pair; 1 if it is local stock, 0 otherwise. M is the dummy for market; 1 if it is bear market, 0 
if it is bull market. 
Table 5 (the two columns on the left) shows the regression results. The experienced 
participants invest significantly more in local stocks but not in the recognized stocks, whereas 
the inexperienced participants invest significantly more in the recognized stocks. The interaction 
of recognition and market is not significant, which means the inexperienced participants use the 
recognition portfolio strategy regardless of the current market conditions. Since there are many 
variables that are not significant in the model, we reduced the model to a simple form, which 
only includes recognition, local stocks, and market. Likelihood ratio tests show that the reduced 
model fits the data as well as the full model.  
 










Intercept 341.68***  376.87***  266.61***  359.1*** 
 [52.91]  [69.23]  [51.65]  [67.97] 
Recognition -9.17  73.77*  -6.22  73.54* 
 [20.75]  [33.85]  [16.09]  [24.86] 
Recognition of the other 
stock -5.15  -27.88     
 [12.47]  [20.69]     
Local 220.18***  44.1  160.87*  13.72 
 [67.06]  [88.79]  [64.26]  [82.92] 











Local of the other stock  -11.66  -16.85     
 [20.35]  [25.38]     
Market -21.22  -53.98***  -24.26*  -58.54*** 
 [12.75]  [15.57]  [10.42]  [13.77] 
R*L -96.19  -72.02     
 [63.17]  [79.09]     
R*Market 17.53  20.12     
 [24.23]  [41.00]     
Market*L -61.6  -83.02     
 [58.86]  [60.21]     
R*Local*Market 77.02  17.25     
   [79.32]  [105.23]       
No.of  observations  6508 5276 6508 5276 
No.of left-censored 
observations  1449 1342 1449 1342 
No.of uncensored 
observations  4604 3473 4604 3473 
No.of right-censored 
observations  455 461 455 461 
rho  0.31 0.24 0.31 0.24 
Note: The coefficients of 60 stocks dummies are not included in the table. The two columns 
on the left show the results of the full model. The two columns on the right show the results of 
the reduced model. *** p<0.00; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Standard error in the brackets 
 
The results of the reduced model (the two columns on the right) confirm that our results are 
not different from the full model. All participants invest less in bear market than in bull market. 
The experienced participants show local bias but ignore the recognition information. By contrast, 
the inexperienced participants trust the recognized stocks more and ignore the local information. 
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Next, we replaced recognition with familiarity. Figure 10 lists the average investments in 
with ID treatment, categorized by market, local stock, and familiarity; 10a indicates the results of 
the experienced group, 10b those of the inexperienced group. We ran the Tobit subject random 
effect model and replaced recognition with familiarity. The model we used is as follows: 
 
, where Fam=0, 1, 2,…, 7 is the familiarity with stock j; FamP is the familiarity with the other 
stock in the same pair. 
Table 6 shows that when we replace recognition with familiarity, results do not change. 
The experienced participants only invest more in local stocks, whereas the inexperienced 
participants’ investments increase with the level of familiarity. 
In summary, our data indicate that the inexperienced participants do not show local bias. 
They have no investment experience and have no knowledge of the stock market; therefore, the 
local information is of no use for them, whereas recognition and familiarity with stocks matter 
more to them. However, the experienced participants only invest more in local stocks but do not 
invest more in recognized and familiar stocks. In our experiment, we find no evidence that 
familiarity is the reason for local bias (Feng and Seasholes, 2004, Hiraki et al., 2003, Huberman, 
2001, Zhu, 2002).  Even though the inexperienced participants are more familiar with local 
stocks, they do not invest more in them; whereas for the experienced participants, recognition 
and familiarity are obviously not enough to make them increase their investments. What counts 
for them is the local information. 
 





































Bear market Bull market
nonlocal local nonlocal local
a. Experienced Group
Unrecognized Familiarity level 1
Familiarity level 2 Familiarity level 3
Familiarity level 4 Familiarity level 5









































Bear market Bull market
nonlocal local nonlocal local
b. Inexperienced Group
Unrecognized Familiarity level 1
Familiarity level 2 Familiarity level 3
Familiarity level 4 Familiarity level 5
Familiarity level 6 Familiarity level 7
 
Fig. 10. Average investments (ECU) in stocks in with ID treatment, categorized by market, local 
stock, and familiarity. The higher the familiarity level, the more familiar participants are with the 
stocks. 
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Intercept 343.79***  365.62***  371.32***  361.57*** 
 [52.87]  [68.06]  [51.13]  [67.92] 
Familiarity -1.03  25.73*  1.69  25.05*** 
  [4.78] [10.22] [3.66]  [7.25] 
Familiarity with the other 
stock -2.64  -11.70     
  [2.97] [6.37]     
Local 96.41  50.12  162.35*  11.74 
 [74.39]  [87.31]  [66.25]  [82.91] 
Local of the other stock  -10.78  -15.19     
 [20.22]  [25.42]     
Market -21.00  -54.45***  -24.26*  -58.53*** 
 [12.25]  [15.19]  [10.42]  [13.77] 
Fam*L -8.68  -32.54     
 [12.88]  [20.71]     
Fam*M 4.57  8.67     
 [5.62]  [12.52]     
M*L -56.41  -69.96     
 [51.80]  [56.49]     
Fam*M*L 23.55  18.93     
   [16.96]  [27.92]       
No. of observations  6508  5276  6508  5276 
No.of left-censored 
observations 1449  1342  1449  1342 
No.of uncensored 
observations 4604  3473  4604  3473 
No. of right-censored 
observations 455  461  455  461 











rho  0.31 0.24 0.30 0.24 
Note: The coefficients of 60 stocks dummies are not included in the table. The two columns on 
the left show the results of the full model. The two columns on the right show the results of the 
reduced model. *** p<0.00; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Standard error in the brackets 
 
4. Conclusions  
Our main purpose in this paper has been to test whether participants use familiarity-based 
and recognition-based portfolio strategies to choose stocks and whether recognition can 
influence investors’ portfolio behavior, e.g., whether recognition makes participants feel more 
competent when making investment decisions so that they invest more in the stock market (keep 
less cash). Since familiarity is considered to be one of the main reasons for local bias, we also 
tested if local bias occurred in our experiment. Local bias is a highly common phenomenon, 
which has been found in many countries and different investor groups of both individual 
(laypeople) and institutional investors (experts) (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, Feng and 
Seasholes, 2004, Hiraki et al., 2003, Huberman, 2001, Zhu, 2002). Thus, we categorized our 
participants into two groups, experienced (experts) and inexperienced (laypeople), to test 
whether these two groups of investors behave differently; we  tested for familiarity and 
recognition-based strategy in both bull and bear markets.  
Not surprisingly, all participants invested more in the stock market in bull market than in 
bear market, even though we did not inform them explicitly about the market type. In bear 
market, the inexperienced participants were more conservative than the experienced participants: 
when the market was down, they kept even more cash than the experienced participants. Unlike 
in the between-subject design (Ackert (2005) and Weber (2005)), in a within-subject design the 
provision of stocks’ IDs did not make the participants invest more in the stock market. Further 
tests showed that the provision of unrecognized names had the same effect as no name provision.  
Furthermore, we tested if the amount invested in the stock market increases with the number of 
recognized stocks (from 0 to 1 and 2). Analysis showed that this is not the case within subjects, 
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e.g., subjects do not invest more in the stock market when more stocks are recognized. However, 
the hypothesis holds for between subjects; e.g., those subjects who recognize more stocks in 
general invest more in the stock market than those who do not. 
The results of our experiment show that all participants are more familiar with local stocks. 
Unlike the results of Giofré (2008) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), the inexperienced 
participants are not more strongly influenced by the local and recognition / familiarity 
information than the experienced participants. Rather, the participants from the two groups are 
totally influenced by different information. The experienced participants show local bias. They 
do not invest more in the familiar and recognized stocks. Familiarity and recognition are not 
enough for the experienced participants to increase their investments. For them the local 
information is decisive. In contrast, the inexperienced participants invest more in the recognized 
and familiar stocks, regardless of the current market conditions, and ignore the local information. 
In our experimental settings, recognition has no correlation with a stock’s returns. Therefore, 
unlike the results of Oppenheimer (2003), Newell et al. (2004), and Pohl (2006), the 
inexperienced participants do use the recognition-based strategy even when the recognition cue 
has no positive validity. Based on our experiment, we cannot conclude that local bias exists 
because of familiarity.  
It may be argued that there is a big difference between the experienced participants in our 
experiment and the real ‘experts.’ But we were interested if the more experienced participants 
would be less influenced by the local and recognition/familiarity information than the 
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Appendix A: Detailed information on 60 stocks. 
 
Trading 
Symbol Reporting  Instrument  ISIN  Sector  Location 
Market Cap. (in 
Mio.)
3 
1  AIXA  AIXTRON AG NA O.N.  DE000A0WMPJ6  Technology  Herzogenrath  956.81 
2  ARO  ARCANDOR AG O.N.  DE0006275001  Retail  Essen  50.21 
3  NDA  AURUBIS AG  DE0006766504  Basic resources  Hamburg  799.09 
4  BBZA  BB BIOTECH NAM.      SF 1  CH0038389992  Pharma & Healthcare 
Küsnacht/Zürich-
Switzerland 786.40 
5  BC8  BECHTLE AG O.N.  DE0005158703  Software  Neckarsulm  141.22 
6  GBF  BILFINGER BERGER AG  DE0005909006 Construction  Mannheim  1,300.38 
7  AFX  CARL-ZEISS MEDITEC AG  DE0005313704  Pharma & Healthcare  Jena  280.60 
8  CLS1  CELESIO AG NAM. O.N.  DE000CLS1001  Retail  Stuttgart  1,404.87 
9  CON  CONTINENTAL AG O.N.  DE0005439004  Automobile  Hannover  438.35 
10  DEQ  DEUTSCHE EUROSHOP AG O.N.  DE0007480204  Financial services  Hamburg  619.18 
11  DPB  DEUTSCHE POSTBANK AG NA  DE0008001009  Banks  Bonn  1,505.32 
12  DOU  DOUGLAS HOLDING O.N.  DE0006099005  Retail  Hagen  675.66 
13  DRW3  DRAEGERWERK VZO O.N.  DE0005550636  Pharma & Healthcare  Lübeck  127.89 
14  ZIL2  ELRINGKLINGER AG NA O.N.  DE0007856023  Automobile  Dettingen/ Erms  346.71 
15 EAD  EUROP.AERON.DEF.+SP.  EADS  NL0000235190  Industrial 
Schiphol Rijk, 
Netherlands 4,804.02 
16  FIE  FIELMANN AG O.N.  DE0005772206  Retail  Hamburg  588.25 
17  FRA  FRAPORT AG FFM.AIRPORT  DE0005773303 
Transportation & 
Logistics  Frankfurt am Main  1,133.04 
18  FPE3  FUCHS PETROL.AG VZO O.N.  DE0005790430  Chemicals  Mannheim  506.68 
19  G1A  GEA GROUP AG  DE0006602006  Industrial  Bochum  1,774.53 
20  GIL  GILDEMEISTER AG O.N.  DE0005878003 Industrial  Bielefeld  326.50 
21 HDD  HEIDELBERG.DRUCKMA.O.N.  DE0007314007 Industrial  Heidelberg  317.43 
22  HEI  HEIDELBERGCEMENT AG O.N.  DE0006047004  Construction  Heidelberg  519.43 
23 HOT  HOCHTIEF  AG  DE0006070006  Construction  Essen  1,917.05 
24  BOS3  HUGO BOSS AG VZO O.N.  DE0005245534  Consumer  Metzingen  280.63 
25  HRX  HYPO REAL ESTATE HLDG  DE0008027707  Banks  Unterschleißheim  181.43 
26  IDS  IDS SCHEER AG O.N.  DE0006257009  Software  Saarbrücken  249.66 
27  IFX  INFINEON TECH.AG NA O.N.  DE0006231004  Technology  Neubiberg  2,430.28 
28  IVG  IVG IMMOBILIEN AG O.N.  DE0006205701 Financial  services Bonn  363.64 
29  JEN  JENOPTIK AG O.N.  DE0006229107  Industrial  Jena  125.04 
30 KBC  KONTRON  AG  O.N.  DE0006053952  Technology  Eching  409.96 
31  KRN  KRONES AG O.N.  DE0006335003  Industrial  Neutraubling  364.03 
32 KU2  KUKA  AG  DE0006204407  Industrial  Augsburg  169.35 
33  LEO  LEONI AG NA O.N.  DE0005408884  Automobile  Nürnberg  365.93 
34  MDG  MEDIGENE NA O.N.  DE0005020903  Pharma & Healthcare  Martinsried/München  127.21 
35  MLP  MLP AG  DE0006569908  Financial services  Wiesloch  345.28 
36  MOR  MORPHOSYS AG O.N.  DE0006632003  Pharma & Healthcare  Martinsried/München  323.17 
37  PFV  PFEIFFER VACUUM TECH.O.N.  DE0006916604  Industrial  Asslar  444.00 
38 PFD4  PFLEIDERER  AG  DE0006764749  Industrial  Neumarkt  196.91 
39 PSM  PROSIEBENSAT.1  O.N.VZO  DE0007771172 Media  Unterföhring  362.84 
40 PUM  PUMA  AG  DE0006969603  Consumer  Herzogenaurach  821.80 
                                                            
 
3  Market capital data are from 31 July 2009. / 31.07.2009. 




Symbol Reporting  Instrument  ISIN  Sector  Location 
Market Cap. (in 
Mio.)
3 
41  QIA  QIAGEN NV         EO -,01  NL0000240000  Pharma & Healthcare  KJ Venlo, Netherlands  2,659.71 
42  QSC  QSC AG NA O.N.  DE0005137004  Telecommunication  Köln  143.79 
43  RAA  RATIONAL AG  DE0007010803  Industrial  Landsberg a. Lech  277.90 
44 RHM  RHEINMETALL  AG  DE0007030009  Industrial  Düsseldorf  1,179.34 
45 RHK  RHOEN-KLINIKUM  O.N.  DE0007042301  Pharma & Healthcare  Bad Neustadt/ Saale  1,451.84 
46  RSI  ROFIN SINAR TECHS  DL-,01  US7750431022  Industrial  Plymouth- USA  442.33 
47  SGL  SGL CARBON SE O.N.  DE0007235301  Chemicals  Wiesbaden  1,019.13 
48  SNG  SINGULUS TECHNOL.  DE0007238909  Industrial  Kahl am Main  72.89 
49  SOW  SOFTWARE AG O.N.  DE0003304002  Software  Darmstadt  1,069.30 
50 SOO1 SOLON  SE  O.N.  DE0007471195  Industrial  Berlin  81.35 
51  SAZ  STADA ARZNEIMITT.VNA O.N.  DE0007251803  Pharma & Healthcare  Bad Vilbel  1,001.27 
52  SZU  SUEDZUCKER MA./OCHS. O.N.  DE0007297004  Food & Beverages  Mannheim  978.20 
53 TUI1  TUI  AG NA  DE000TUAG000 
Transportation & 
Logistics Hannover  623.50 
54 UTDI UTD.INTERNET  AG  NA  DE0005089031  Software  Montabaur  1,031.70 
55  VOS  VOSSLOH AG O.N.  DE0007667107  Industrial  Werdohl  705.23 
56 WIN  WINCOR  NIXDORF  O.N.  DE000A0CAYB2 Industrial  Paderborn  1,245.98 
57 WDI  WIRECARD  AG  DE0007472060  Software  Grasbrunn  710.20 
58  AJA  ANALYTIK JENA AG O.N.  DE 0005213508  industrial  Jena  24.71 
59  BIB  BIOLITEC AG O.N.  DE0005213409  Pharma & Healthcare  Jena  13.19 
60 ISH2 
INTERSHOP COMMUNICATIONS 
AG DE000A0EPUH1  Software  Jena  41.13 
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Appendix B:  Recognition Details and Familiarity Score of 60 stocks 
 Stocks 
Nr. of participants 







1 Elringklinger  AG  2  0.05  0.25  0.00 
2 Aurubis  AG  5 0.06  1.02  0.29 
3  Fuchs Petrol AG  4  0.07  0.20  0.00 
4  Rofin-Sinar Technologies Inc.  4  0.08  1.73  0.53 
5 Morphosys  AG  4  0.08 0.27  0.03 
6 Wirecard  AG  5 0.08  0.71  0.16 
7 Vossloh  AG  5 0.08  2.56  1.14 
8 Solon  SE  5  0.08  2.56  1.28 
9 Kontron  AG  4 0.09  2.09  1.00 
10 GEA  Group  AG  7  0.10  0.94  0.21 
11 Krones  AG  8 0.11  1.06  0.08 
12 Singulus  Technology  8  0.11  1.77  1.01 
13 Kuka  AG  5  0.11  0.21  0.03 
14 Leoni  AG  7  0.11  0.25  0.06 
15  SGL Carbon SE  8  0.11  0.39  0.09 
16 Medigene  9  0.12  0.73  0.10 
17 IVG  Immobilien  AG  9  0.13  0.65  0.22 
18 Gildemeister  AG  7  0.13  0.20  0.00 
19  Deutsche Euroshop AG  9  0.13  0.17  0.08 
20 Celesio  AG  11  0.14  0.15  0.00 
21 Aixtron  AG  7 0.14  0.08  0.07 
22 Pfleiderer  AG  9  0.14 0.15  0.00 
23 Bechtle  AG  9 0.14  2.89  1.31 
24 QSC  AG  8  0.15  0.14  0.07 
25 Rational  AG  10 0.16  0.21  0.00 
26 Qiagen  NV  11  0.16  3.28  1.79 
27  Drägerwerk AG & Co KG aA  11  0.17  0.25  0.00 
28  Pfeiffer Vacuum Technology AG  15  0.26  1.80  0.55 
29 Biolitec  AG  22  0.31  0.15  0.00 
30 Rhön-Klinikum  AG  27  0.45  0.11  0.00 
31 IDS  Scheer  AG  28  0.45 0.28  0.03 
32 Software  AG  29 0.46  1.86  0.66 
33  United Internet AG  21  0.49  0.16  0.00 
34 Heidelbergcement  AG  22  0.50  2.47  1.14 
35  BB Biotech AG  39  0.61  0.77  0.15 
36  Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG  28  0.61  0.15  0.00 
37  Bilfinger Berger AG  50  0.69  0.17  0.01 
38 EADS  NV  40  0.75  1.18  0.67 
39 MLP  AG  38  0.80  3.45  1.83 
40  Stada Arzneimittel AG 52  0.83  0.18 0.05 
41  Wincor Nixdorf AG  55  0.95  0.22  0.02 
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 Stocks 
Nr. of participants 







42 Fraport  AG  55  1.02  0.20  0.09 
43 Rheinmetall  AG  76  1.19  2.81  1.41 
44 Douglas  Holding  AG  70  1.23  2.60  1.28 
45 Südzucker  AG  81  1.31 1.29  0.28 
46  Analytik Jena AG  85  1.43  0.09  0.00 
47 Hochtief  AG  90 1.59  1.42  0.54 
48 Tui  AG  108  1.71  3.29  1.46 
49  Infineon Technology AG  103  1.83  1.16  0.37 
50  Intershop Communiction AG  101  1.86  0.26  0.00 
51 Puma  AG  107  1.86  2.60  0.98 
52  Hugo Boss AG  111  1.92  0.15  0.00 
53  Carl Zeiss Meditec AG  112  1.98  0.83  0.10 
54 Arcandor  AG  113 1.98  0.20  0.01 
55 Fielmann  AG  115 2.00  2.47  1.07 
56 Continental  AG  121  2.17  2.61  1.23 
57  Prosiebensat1 Media AG  113  2.18  0.22  0.03 
58  Hypo Real Estate Holding AG  128  2.46  1.18  0.23 
59 Jenoptik  AG  141  2.60  2.37  0.91 
60 Deutsche  Postbank  155  2.71  0.50  0.08 
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Appendix C: Experimental Instructions 
Welcome to our lab. This experiment is about portfolio decision making, and you can earn real 
money based on your decisions. From now on, any communication - verbal or written - between 
participants is forbidden. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. A member of our 
staff will come to your cabin and answer your question privately. It is very important to follow 
these rules; otherwise we will have to exclude you from the experiment and the payment.  
Before the experiment starts, please fill in a questionnaire indicating your age, gender, main field 
of studies, etc.   
There are 2 parts in our experiment: the so-called portfolio decisions and a questionnaire.  
The first part of the experiment – portfolio decision making – has 30 rounds. In every round you 
will make a portfolio decision under Information set 1 and thereupon under Information set 2.    
 
Part I. Portfolio Decisions:  
 
Portfolio Decision I: 
1.  You will receive the information about the development of the price and the returns of 
two stocks (A and B). The information is composed of the prices and returns of stocks A 
and B from the German stock market (Xetra, Deutsche Börse Gruppe), which are 
calculated at the end of each month. You will see this information for 30 successive 
months.  Information set 1. 
2.  For the portfolio decision, you will receive 1,200 experimental currency units (ECU). 
Afterwards you will have the possibility either to invest the 1,200 ECU in the two stocks 
or to keep them as cash.  
3.  The return of the next (31
st) month of stocks A and B will be revealed to you. 
4.  You will learn the amount of the return of your investments. The return shows the ratio of 
the money which you have earned or lost through your investment to the amount of 
money which has been actually invested. The return is a consequence of the prices: if the 
prices go up, the return will be positive; if the prices go down, the return will be negative.  
5.  Your gain during this portfolio decision will be calculated and displayed to you.  
 
Portfolio Decision II: 
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1.  Again, you will receive some information about the prices and returns of the same 
stocks (A and B). The information will tell you about the prices of the same stocks A 
and B (Xetra, Deutsche Börse Gruppe) at the end of the month, but this time for 
ANOTHER successive 30 months. Information set 2. 
2.  The same as above 
3.  The same as above 
4.  The same as  above 
5.  The same as above    
 
Altogether for the Information set 1 and Information set 2 you will make portfolio decisions 
in 30 rounds. 
In every new round there will be different investment options. It means that there will be 30 
pairs of investment possibilities during the 30 rounds. (Round 1: A(1) und B(1); Round 2: A(2) 
und B(2); Round 3: A(3) und B(3); …).   
Example: 
During one portfolio decision you will decide how many ECU you invest in the investment 
option and how many ECU you keep in your account. In order to do this, you have to enter 3 
numbers in 3 input boxes. The sum of these numbers must be equal to 1,200 ECU. 
For example, you invest 600 ECU in stock A and 500 ECU in stock B. Thus you must have 
100 ECU in your account. If you invest 450 ECU in A and 750 ECU in B, you will have 0 
ECU left in your account. 
The figure below shows what the screen looks like. 
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Please note that some of the figures show additional information, e.g., the name of the 
company, the place of the headquarters, and the relevant economic sector.  
The Payoff: 
At the end of every portfolio decision you will be informed about the return of your 
investments, i.e., about your gain and loss due to your investments. Hence, your gain and loss 
depend on your investment decisions and the return of the stock options. If you invest a large 
amount of money in an investment option and it has a positive return, you will have a large 
gain. If you invested a smaller amount, the gain would be smaller accordingly. If the return is 
negative, you will even have some losses. The ECU which you do not invest will remain in 
your account and will cause neither gain nor loss. 
To be precise, your gains/losses and payoff in every round will be calculated by 
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                  Gain/loss from stock A: xArA 
                         Gain/loss from stock B:  xBrB 
                               ) 200 , 1 ( ) ( ) ( B A B B B A A A x x r x x r x x Payoff        , 
where: 
‐  rA and rB  are realized returns of 2 stocks, which have been disclosed in the following 
month. 
‐  xA and xB are the amounts of money (ECU) you have invested in two stocks. 
‐  (1,200-xA-xB) shows the amount of money which you have not invested, i.e., the amount 
of money you kept in your account. 
Part II. Questionnaire 
After you finish the first part, you will receive/ get the instruction for the second part  of the 
experiment on the computer screen. 
Your actual payoff at the end of the experiment will be calculated as follows: 
One session out of the 60 portfolio decisions will be randomly selected for the payoff. 
Your selected portfolio decision will be converted at the exchange rate of 100 ECU = 1 euro 
and will be paid to you in cash. 
When you are finished with the experiment, please raise your hand. A member of our staff 
will come to you and will pay you the money in your cabin. Please remain seated in your 
cabin until then and do not speak with other participants of the experiment. As soon as you 
have received your payoff, you are allowed to leave the laboratory.  
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Before starting the experiment, please answer some control questions on your computer screen. 
They should assure that you have fully understood the rules of the experiment. 
Control Questions: 
1.   What is the difference of the portfolio decisions due to information status 1 and 2? 
a)  Different endowment of ECU. 
b)  Different information about the prices at the end of the 30 months. 
c)  Different investment option. 
 
2.  What is the difference between the 30 rounds? 
a)  There are other investment options in every round. 
b)  Different ECU endowment at the beginning. 
c)  Increasing amount of information about investment options. 
 
3.  Which of the following statements is right? 
a)  You will receive/get the sum of the whole gain in all of the rounds. 
b)  You will receive/get the sum of portfolio decision I and portfolio decision II. 
c)  You will receive/get the gain of a randomly selected round out of 60 rounds. 
 
4.  Which of the following statements is right? 
a)  You will receive 1,200 ECU in every information status. 
b)  You will receive 1,200 ECU in every round. 
c)  You will receive 1,200 ECU at the beginning of the experiment.   
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